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The question of whether new technology requires new law is central to the field of law and technology. From Frank
Easterbrook’s “law of the horse” to Ryan Calo’s law of robotics, scholars have debated the what, why, and how of
technological, social, and legal co-development and construction. Given how rarely lawmakers create new legal
regimes around a particular technology, the EU’s proposed “AI Act” (Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts) should
put tech-law scholars on high alert. Leaked early this spring and officially released in April 2021, the AI Act aims to
establish a comprehensive European approach to AI risk-management and compliance, including bans on some AI
systems.
In Demystifying the Draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Michael Veale and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius provide a
helpful and evenhanded entrée into this “world-first attempt at horizontal regulation of AI systems.” One the one hand,
they admire the Act’s “sensible” aspects, including its risk-based approach, prohibitions of certain systems, and
attempts at establishing public transparency. On the other, they note its “severe weaknesses” including its reliance on
“1980s product safety regulation” and “standardisation bodies with no fundamental rights experience.”. For U.S. (and
EU!) readers looking for a thoughtful overview and contextualization of a complex and somewhat inscrutable new legal
system, this Article brings much to the table at a relatively concise length.
As an initial matter, it’s important to understand that the Draft AI Act is just the beginning of the European legislative
process. Much can still change. And the Act must be understood in legal context: it is entwined with other EU
Regulations (such as the GDPR), Directives (such as the Law Enforcement Directive and Unfair Commercial Practices
Directive), and AI-specific initiatives in progress (such as the draft Data Governance Act and forthcoming product
liability revisions).
The AI Act itself focuses on risk management and compliance, looking at threats to physical safety and fundamental
rights. At its core, the Act is an attempt to reduce trade barriers while also addressing fundamental rights concerns.
According to Veale and Borgesius, by primarily relying on product safety regulations and bodies, the AI Act gets the
balance wrong.
Not all is bad, however. Veale and Borgesius appreciate the AI Act’s division of AI practices into four risk levels:
unacceptable (Title II), high (Title III), limited (Title IV), and minimal (Title IX). AI systems with unacceptable risks trigger
full or partial prohibitions, while high risk systems are regulated based on the EU approach to products safety (the New
Legislative Framework or NLF). But Veale and Borgesius note that at closer examination, neither the prohibitions nor
the regulations are as robust as they might appear.
For example, take the ban on biometric systems, which at first appears to be precisely what some scholars have called
for. The Act bans most “real-time” and “remote” law enforcement uses of biometric systems in publicly accessible
spaces (Art. 5(1)(d)). Notably, systems that analyze footage after-the-fact are not included. Nor is live biometric
identification online, nor is the use of remote biometric identification for non-law enforcement purposes, which falls
under the GDPR. And Member States may create yet more exceptions, by authorizing certain law enforcement uses of
real-time biometrics, so long as they include certain safeguards. Veale and Borgesius rightly point out that the ample
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exceptions to the Act’s limited biometrics ban mean that the infrastructure for biometrics systems will still be installed,
leading some to claim that the Act “legitimises rather than prohibits population-scale surveillance.” Moreover, nothing
in the Act prevents EU companies from marketing such biometrics systems to oppressive regimes abroad.
The most complex and unfamiliar aspect of the Act is its regulation of high-risk systems. There, according to Veale and
Borgesius, the Act collapses the protection of fundamental rights into the EU’s approach to product safety, to its
detriment. The NLF is used to regulate toys, elevators, and personal protective equipment, and is completely unfamiliar
to most information law scholars (we will have to learn fast!). Under the NLF, manufacturers perform a “conformity
assessment” and effectively self-certify that they are in compliance with “essential requirements” under the law. Here,
those requirements are listed in Chapter 2 of the Act, and include a quality management system, a risk management
system, and data quality criteria, among other things. Manufacturers can mark conforming products with “CE,” which
guarantees freedom of movement within the EU.
By contrast, Veale and Borgesius point to the path not taken: EU pharmaceutical regulation requires pre-marketing
assessment and licensing by a public authority. Here, the public sector has a much more limited role to play. There are
“almost no situations” in which such industry AI self-assessments will require approval by an independent technical
organization, and even then, such organizations are usually private sector certification firms accredited by Member
States.
Post-marketing, the AI Act again reflects the NLF by giving “market surveillance authorities” (MSAs)—typically existing
regulatory agencies—the power to obtain information, apply penalties, withdraw products, etc. While AI providers must
inform MSAs if their own post-market monitoring reveals risks, Member States have discretion as to which authorities
will be responsible for monitoring and enforcing against standalone high-risk AI systems. In practice, Veale and
Borgesius observe that this will put technocratic government agencies ordinarily concerned with product regulation in
charge of a range of tasks well outside their usual purview: “to look for synthetic content on social networks, assess
manipulative digital practices of any professional user, and scrutinise the functioning of the digital welfare state…[t]his is
far from product regulation.”
Moreover, Veale and Borgesius point out that private standards-setting organizations will determine much of the
content of the law in practice. The European Commission will likely mandate that several European Standardisation
Organizations develop harmonized standards relating to the Act that companies can follow to be in compliance with it.
For internet governance buffs, the problems with deciding on fundamental values through privatized processes are
familiar, even old hat. But as Veale and Borgesius observe, the Act’s “incorporation of broad fundamental rights topics
into the NLF [regime]… spotlight[s] this tension of legitimacy” in the EU products safety context.
This Article contains many additionally helpful sections, including a summary of the Act’s transparency provisions,
approach to human oversight, and the potential confusion around and problems with the scope of the Act’s
harmonization efforts. I do wish the authors had spent more time on the lack of rights, protections, and complaint
mechanisms for what they call “AI-systems-subjects”—the individuals and communities impacted by the use of AI. As
Veale and Borgesius observe, neither the standards-setting organizations nor the relevant government bodies are
required to take input or complaints from impacted persons. They characterize this primarily as bad regulatory design,
noting that “the Draft AI Act lacks a bottom-up force to hold regulators to account for weak enforcement.” To those of
us steeped in the GDPR’s emphasis on individual rights, the absence of individual rights here is more shocking. I
would be curious to learn about whether this choice/oversight is a real problem, or whether other EU laws nonetheless
enable affected individuals to participate in the EU governance of AI.
Overall, this article is a much-needed guide to an immensely significant regulatory effort. For scholars, it raises
complex questions about not just when new technology leads to new law, but how the choice of legal regime (here,
product safety) establishes path dependencies that construct a technology in particular ways. Veale and Borgesius are
to be applauded for their noted expertise in this space, and for doing the work to make this this regime more accessible
to all.
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